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1. Statement of the Case.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the
Third District Court in an action commenced December
21, 1946 (R. 5) by stockholders of Granite Holding Company, the corporate defendant, to set aside a sale of the
sole remaining assets of that corporation to the individual defendant, W. L. Hansen. The action was secondary for the benefit of the corporation and it was a class
suit as it was initiated by plaintiffs for themselves and
all others. s~ilarly situated.
During the course of the proceedings plaintiff Lewis
F. Hansen withdrew as a plaintiff to which the defendants stipulated, (R. 75) and plaintiffs J. R. Jensen and
W m. V. Jensen, during the progress of the trial hearings, moved for a dismissal as to them which was
granted (R. 102). The fact is that these latter two were
never shown to be stockholders and of course they had
no right in the action. The plaintiffs remaining are
Ralph Cutler, Hettie May Bates and WilliamS. Young,
all stockholders of the corporation prior to bringing
the action and at the time the case was tried (R. 149274-292). The court so found (R. 104). They produced
their stock certificates in court and defendants had
ample opportunity to examine them.

2. The Facts.
We are not at all satisfied with the statement of
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facts presented by the appellant. We feel that it \viii
be extren1ely helpful to the court to nmke a cmnplete
statement of the facts with respect to the matter.
The defendant corporation was organized under the
name of the Granite Lumber Company in 1901. By an
amendinent on ,June 18, 1927 the name was changed to
Granite Holding Company. At one time the company
owned considerable property in the Sugarhouse area in
Salt Lake City. Prior to 1945 it had disposed of all its
property except that involved in this law suit. For years
no meetings of stockholders had been held nor had there
been any meetings of the Board of Directors, except
such as were held to satisfy mortgages. Nephi J. Hansen
managed the Granite Holding Company (R. 209). The
corporation was authorized to and had issued two kind~
of stock, common and preferred, and under the Articles
which are an exhibit in the case, holders of preferred
stock had voting rights upon failure to pay preferred
dividends when three years past due. The three stockholder witnesses, Hettie May Bates (R. 148), Ralph
Cutler (R. 291) and William s~ Young (R. 274) all testified that they had been associated with the company
for many years, had never heard anything about its
affairs, never been called to any stockholders meetings,
but once in a while one of them would meet Nephi J.
Hansen on the streets in Sugarhouse and Mr. Hansen
would put them off with some statement that he was
doing his best to keep things going. Mr. Young testified
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that in August, 1945 he talked to Nephi J. Hansen about
making a trade of some of his stock and Mr. Hansen:did
not say anything to him about the sale of the Sugarhouse
property to his son, which had already been consumIn~ted, and in 1946 he and Mr. Bates called on Hansen
and asked him about revenues and he made no r~ply
except to state that his salary would eat everything up
and on that occasion nothing was said about the sale of
the Sugarhouse property; that he first learned about the
sale of the property a little over a year before the trial;
and that at no time did he ever receive any information
by way of letters, reports or anything with respect to
this company. Mr. Cutler testified that when he first
became a stockholder he got sonie dividends but none
had been paid for a long, long time; that he never received any notice of stockholders meetings; that he was
well acquainted with Nephi J. Hansen; at one time
Nephi J. Hansen told him he was operating the property
under the direction of the mortgagee (R. 297) and upon
one occasion when he asked Nephi J. Hansen about the
property, although Hansen evaded, he did say, "if there
is anything left out of this company I am going to see
that my family gets it" (R. 298) and used cuss words
to emphasize his statement. Upon another occasion
Nephi J. Hansen advised Cutler that once in a while
they held a stockholders meeting when they had some ·
business and when occasion arose he would let Cutler
know (R. 300). Cutler knew nothing about the officers
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of the cmnpany except that Nephi J. Hansen was running it.
Clyde Hansen, a son of Nephi J. Hansen and sf4cretary of the company. testified that his father always had
managed the company (R. 209) and William Hansen
stated that as far as he was concerned his father was
the entire company (R. 412).
In 1945 the Granite Holding Company owned but
one remaining piece of property (R. 311) (R. 430). This
is situated at the corner of 21st South and Highland
Drive in Salt Lake City, with a frontage on 21st South
in excess of 80 feet and on Highland Drive of 207.5 feet.
It is business property. On the ground floor were located many store rooms and upstairs were 24 ·to 26
apartments (R. 185, 186, 187). On July 18, 1945 this
property was mortgaged to the Beneficial Life Insurance
Company, and on July 18, 1945 the balance due on the
mortgage was $74,500.00 (R. 265). In 1941 this mortgage "·as $82,528.13 (R. 267). In July of 1945 there
had been $1961.76 paid by mortgagor, the corporate.
defendant, for 1945 taxes. Interest payments had all
been made, and on June 2, 1945 the interest was paid
up to July 1, 1945, and on July 26, 1945 was paid to
August, 1945. The mortgage originally had been for a
sum of $150,000.00, but that mortgage included other
property which was sold off from time to time (R. 217).
At the time of the trial in June of 1948 the balance due
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on the mortgage was $61,500.00 and there was a credit
balance of $2158.32 to pay taxes.
This property was income producing at the time of,
the sale. Mr. William L. Hansen purchased the property,
investigated it and made up a statement with the help
of his father ( R. 78) which showed gross income of
$13,590.00 in the year 1943, $17,501.00 in the year 1944,
and for the first four months of 1945 of $7,932.00 (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4). There was evidence by , an exceptionally well qualified expert (witness Keipe) (R. 218)
that the fair value of the property at the time of the
sale, that is, July 16, 1945, was $115,000.00 and this
value was arrived at by averaging the cost of replacement new, less depreciation, capitalized earnings value,
and by physically viewing the, premises and appraising
it.
In the spring of 1945 the defendant William Hansen had a conversation with the members of his family,
including his brothers, about getting some portion of
property in which his father was interested for "the
rest of the family". This conversation took place at his
house, and those present were his sister Mary (Mary
Southwick), LaRue, Lew (Lewis F. Hansen), father
(Nephi J. Hansen) and the witness. Thereafter his
brother Lewis went down and checked on the Sugarhouse property and Lewis came back and stated that
he wanted his portion out of other property (R. 307)
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and Willian1 Hansen stated he was interested in getting
his portion out of other property, that is, property other
than the Sugarhouse property, that he never did get
anything out of the other property and he then talked
to his father about obtaining the property in Sugarhouse (R. 307) and that it ·was suggested by his father
that he do something about buying· it. He also testified
(R. 398) his mother first approached him and asked him
if he couldn't do something about the Sugarhouse property. There was testimony William made some cursory
examination (R. 400) and finally took a deed to the
property involved in this suit (Exhibit E) which was
dated and acknowledged July 16, 1945 and recorded July
28, 1945.
\Yilliam Hansen also testifed that the ..only one he
ever knew to have anything to do with the Granite Holding Company was his father (R. 409), that the property
in Sugarhouse had been the main source of livelihood of
his father and mother for many years; that his father
was getting to be an old man, 77 at about the time of the
sale (R. 410) ; that when he stated he talked to the Company about the sale that he really meant that he talked
to his father ( R. 412).
Lewis F. Hansen, a brother of William Hansen and
one of the original plaintiffs, stated that he was present
at a conversation on July 14th before the deed to William Hansen was acknowledged (R. 334), at which his
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two sisters, his brother Clyde, his mother and father,
and his brother William were present, at which time the
matter of the proposed sale of the Sugarhouse property
was under discussion and at which meeting Lewis F.
Hansen stated in substance that he thought something
should be done about the stockholders before the sale
was made, and his brother William replied that it was
none of the business of Lewis F. Hansen about the stockholders, their father (Nephi J. Hansen) had control and
their: father could do what he wanted.
On July 16, 1945 a deed was executed and acknowledged by the defendant Nephi J. Hansen, as president,
and attested by Clyde Hansen, as secretary of the corporation, by which all the property involved in this law
suit was granted to William L. Hansen. Two days thereafter, according to the record, a resolution was enacted
by the Board of Directors of the Granite Holding Company authorizing and directing Nephi J. Hansen to execute and deliver a deed to the property upon payment of
not less than $10,000.00 over and above the amount of
the mortgage. The minutes are Exhibit D. Nowhere in
these minutes is the name of the purchaser of this property mentioned. The witness Clyde Hansen, secretary
of the corporation, testified this was not done to cover
up and that at the time the mmutes were written up he
was not sure his brother William was to be the purchaser, but that everyone knew the property was to be
sold to his brother William (R. 192-193). When con-
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fronted with the deed and his attention ealled to the
fact the deed was dated and acknowledged two days
before the minutes and the resolution, he statt>d he had
no comment to make as to why \Yilliam 's nan1e was not
shown as the purchaser of the property (R. 196); When
it came to paying the money the records show that on
July 27th William L. Hansen delivered a check for
$5,000.00 n1ade payable to Granite Holding Company,
which check was endorsed Granite Holding Company,
and six months later another check for $3,780.24 was delivered and made payable to Granite Holding Company. which check was endorsed Granite Holding Company, N.J.H. and then Hansen Holding Company, N.J.H.
(R. 194) Exhibit G. The first $5,000.00 went to Nephi
J. Hansen on the claim that that much money was owing
him for back salary, although Clyde Hansen testified
that he was secretary, was present at the meeting of
the Board of Directors on July 18th, that the company
had no books or records and that the company had no
one on the payroll (R. 189); that he made no investigation to determine if there was any back salary owing
and just took his father's word for it (R. 196) ; ·that
his father voted for the resolution. He stated that the
company had a bank account at the First National Bank
in Sugarhouse (R. 200) and yet on the face of the check
there is nothing to show but that the check was merely
cashed by Nephi J. Hansen. He stated at R. 427 that
the Hansen Holding Company was one of his father'::;
companies, that the check for $3,780.24 bears his father's
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endorsement, the names on the check ''Granite Holding
Company" and "Hansen Holding Company" both being
in his father's handwriting; that the corporation owed
no debts that he knew of (R. 428) and that he never
asked his father why he put the final payment of money
in the Hansen Holding Company's account, and that
he did not know why the proceeds of the check went to
the Hansen Holding Company instead of being distributed to stockholders. William Hansen, among other
things, testified that he was interested in holding this
property in the family and he wanted to hold it together
so that they would have it for themselves (R. 325).
Lewis F. Hansen, with respect to the same matter,
testified that upon the occasion of the family meeting
when the matter of the sale came up, William made
the statement he wanted to save the property for the
family, to which Lewis countered that "he thought
something ought to be done for the stockholders", which
portion of Lewis Hansen's testimony has already been
referred to (R. 336). Lewis F. Hansen testified that
his sister, Mrs. Southwick, in his presence stated to
William Hansen that William had gotten the property
under false pretenses and that William ought to do
something for the folks, and William replied that it
was none of their business and that if they did not
leave him alone he was going to sell it.
At the time of this sale the property was not listed
with any real estate company nor were any attempts
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made to solicit any offers from any person other than
"\Yilliam Hansen, at least as far as William Hansen
knew nothing like that had been done (R. 411). William
Hansen testified that he did . . talk to a i\lr. Sid Nielson,
a Mr. Harding and former Governor l\iabey. There is
some evidence that Nephi J. Hansen had Inade an attempt
to borrow some additional money on the property ( R. 417).

.-

The testimony was that rents were up, that for the
first time in years there was full occupancy, that tenants
desired to renew their leases and were willing to pay
additional rent, and the condition with respect to the
property was improving (R. 352), and Exhibits 2, 3
and 4 furnished by the defense showed that rental income
was on the up-grade until the time of the sale.
There seems to be some mystery about when the
meeting of the directors was held which ostensibly
authorized and directed Nephi J. Hansen to execute and
deliver a deed and what action was there taken. There
is no question but at that meeting the vacancies in the
Board were filled by putting two members of Nephi J.
Hansen's family on the Board, one his daughter and
one his ·wife, and Hoo1ler Knowlton, a real estate man
in Sugarhouse, a long time friend of Nephi J. Hansen
and for some time a tenant of Nephi J. Hansen (R. 181).
Lewis F. Hansen testified he signed the minutes under
protest some four months after July 18, 1945 at the
office of counsel for appellant, and, as already stated,
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his evidence was that at that meeting the only authorization given to Nephi J. Hansen was to look into the
possibility of a sale (R. 342). Mary Southwick, a
daughter of Nephi J. Hansen, testified that she .had
had no previous business experience, that she acted as
a director at the request of her father (R. 261) and
the first time she acted was upon the occasion when the
resolution was made with respect to the sale of the
property (R. 260). She said she never bought any stock
and she does not know whether she ever saw Exhibit F,
(the .certificate in her name) before or not; and that
she was told that she was made a director and that she
had a share of stock (R. 261). She testified her moth~r
(Laura F. Hansen) was not at the meeting; (R. 262)
that her father was getting along towards 80 years of
age, that they were worried about him and that something had to be done to relieve him. The net results of
the meeting of July 18, 1945 were these : A board of
directors consisting of the following:
Nephi J. Hansen
Laura F. Hansen
Clyde F. Hansen
Lewis F. Hansen
M·ary H. Southwick
Hooper Knowlton
Joseph E. Jensen

Father
Mother
Brother
Brother
Sister
Tenant and lifelong friend
of Nephi J. Hansen .
Dead at the time of the trial,
about the same age as
Nephi J. Hansen, a long
time friend and acquaint-
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ance of Nephi J. Hansen
and an employee .of Nephi
J. Hansen from the' time
the business was started
(R. 182)
apparently proceeded to authorize the sale of corporate
property to a son and brother of the officers of this
corporation and a son and brother of the majority of
the directors of this corporation when that sale had already been consummated without putting in the resolution the name of the purchaser, although it was well
known, and authorized the President of the corporation,
the father of the family, to convert $5,000.00 of the
claimed purchase price to himself on a claim for back
salary asserted by him to be owing and not hacked up
by the books and records and not investigated by any
officer of the company, and that six months later Nephi
J. Hansen, the father, without any protest or question
by any of the other officers or directors of the company
approp.riated to himself the balance of approximatel-y:
$3800.00 paid by his son.

3. The Matter of Tender.
Appellant raises the proposition that because the
plaintiffs did not tender in court the amount of money
paid by the defendant William L. Hansen, i.e., $8,780.24,
that they have no standing whatsoever.
In connection with .this proposition it should be
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borne in mind that in the first place this is a derivative
action by stockholders for the benefit of the corporation
as well as a class action by the plaintiffs for themselve;;
and all others similarly situated, and it should also be
borne in mind that the plaintiffs got nothing whatsoever
of the moneys paid by William L. Hansen and, under
the facts, neither did the corporatio. The evidence was
that this first $5,000.00 went to Nephi J. Hansen for
alleged back salary, the authority thereof being voted
by a Board of Directors consisting of himself, the immediate members of his family and close personal friends,
without any books and records or any investigation by
the directors and officers including the Secretary and
Treasurer as to the claim being valid, and the testimony
by the Secretary that the company had no payrolls and
owed no old bills ; and that the balance of the sale price
was appropriated by the president of the corporation
without any apparent authority whatsoever. It also
should be borne in mind that the trial court (No. 7)
found that moneys paid were converted by Nephi J.
Hansen, the president of the corporation, to his own
use and that the defendant William L. Hansen knew
that the moneys were not used for corporate purposes.
As a general proposition we agree that ordinarily in a
suit to rescind a sale and recover property one going
into a court of equity must do equity and make a tender,
but this rule has many and varied exceptions. Many
of the exceptions are stated in Williston on Contracts,
Sections 1530 and 1531. Some of the exceptions are
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where claiins are n1ade by plaintiffs that moneys are
due and owing fron1 a person that has the property,
where an accounting must be had between the partie.;;,
where the court can take care of any moneys found due
the defendant and the decree can thus protect the rights
of the defendant, and where stockholders bring a secondary action for the benefit of a corporation, to say
nothing of where, as in this case, the corporation on
whose behalf the action was instituted gets nothing out
of the proposed sale.
\Yith respect to one of these propositions, we refer
the court to an Arizona case decided in 1914, Frank lin
v. Havalena Mining Company, 141 Pacific 727, where
the court stated that in a complaint by stockholders seeking to set aside a lease of the corporate property, the
plaintiff need not offer to return any moneys to the defendant which he had expended because that is a matter
of defense and the court in making its decree will protect the rights of the defendant.
We also refer the court to a case in Montana, Hanrahan v. Anderson, et al, 90 Pacific 2d, 494, decided in
1939. This was a secondary action by stockholders, and
we quote a portion of the court's decision appearing at
page 505.
"We have saved until the last the questions
as to plaintiff's right to relief, because they are
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several and 'are based 11pon various fact situations. Defendants contend that, as plaintiff did
not offer to restore everything of value rec~ived
in the transactions attacked, his complaint failed
to state a cause of action, and that defendants'
objection to the introduction of any evidence
should have been sustained.
"It is well settled that in a stockholder's suit
in behalf of the corporation, he need make no
offer· to restore, for, not having himself received
anything, there is nothing within his power to
restore. Anderson v. Scandia Mining Syndicate,
26 S.D. 558, 128 N.W. 1016; Edwards v. Mercantile Trust Co., C.C., 124 F. 381; Stebbins v. Perry
County, 167 Ill. 567, 47 N.E. 1048; McDermont
v. Anaheim Union Water Co., 124 Cal. 112, 56 P.
779; 6 Thompson on Corporations, 3d ed., sec.
4578, and cases there cited. Obviously, it is not
the stockholder, but the corporation, which must
make whatever restoration, if any, the court may
find equitable and upon which it may therefore
predicate relief.''
And we call the court's attention to the fact that
the Montana Supreme Court cites a North Dakota case,
a Federal case, an Illinois case, a California case and
Thompson on Corporations in support of the language
above quoted.
''Failure of minority stockholders, suing for
the corporation to rescind an illegal sale of its
stock, to offer to restore consideration received
and retained by the company, is not fatal, since

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~9

the suit is in equity and the court Inay, by its
'decree, do full jus tire between the parties.''

Michaels v. Pacifio Soft TYater Laundry (Cal.), 286
Pacific 165, 1071.
''Stockholders need not tender back consideration which they do not have, and where there
was no real consideration passed.''

Citizens Savings d!i Trust Co. v. Illinois Central
Railroad, 182 Fed. 607, reversing 173 Fed. 556.

4. The Matter of Fraud.
Here is a corporation that Nephi J. Hansen operated as if he were the sole owner and as if he had no
duties to discharge except those he saw fit to impose
upon himself, and without the slightest conception of
the fiduciary relationship which he bore to the owners
of this business. The records are complete with evidence that no stockholder at any tim,e, exce:pt perhaps
the immediate members of Nephi J. Hansen's family,
knew anything about what was going on. Inquiries directed to Nephi J. Hansen elicited nothing except evasion and falsehood. There is no contradiction in the
record with respect to the statements made by witnesse~
Young and Cutler as to the conversations with Nephi J.
Hansen, and these statements alone show that Nephi tT.
Hansen recognized no right in anybody to question his
handling of the property.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The family of Nephi J. Hansen regarded this property as the property of Nephi J. Hansen and ultimately
the property of the family. The very first talk about
any sale of this property was brought up at a family
conference. The matter was introduced by the mother
according to the defendant William L. Hansen. In 1945
the evidence is that the family, including the defendants
Nephi J. Hansen and his son William Hansen, met and
talked about dividing up their father's property, including the property in question, and when William Hansen
was unable to get anything out of other property at that
time owned by Nephi J. Hansen he asked his father
about obtaining the property in Sugarhouse, the property involved in this action. Mary Southwick, a sister,
testified in this case that her only concern with respect
to this matter of business was to relieve her father, as
he was getting along towards 80. No suggestion apparently was ever made by anyone that the proper
method was to call the stockholders together, elect a new
and proper board of directors and appoint someone to
manage the property who was efficient and capable of
doing so. Instead, by common consent of the family,
they decided that the son William should now step in,
and son William's idea about it was very aptly expressed when he stated at the family conference that it
was no business of the stockholders and that his father
could do with the property as he saw fit. Clyde Hansen,
one of the brothers, was secretary and treasurer of this
corporation in name only. His testimony is a complete
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refutation of any argument that he had any interest to
serve except as to act as a figure-head and carry out
his father's interests and the interests of the Hansen
family. He knew nothing about any books, he said there
never had been any books as long as he had been ·secretary and treasurer, that he was not a bookkeeper, kne'v
nothing about rental incomes, in fact, he knew nothing
about anything affecting this corporation. Mary Southwick was giYen a share of stock a few days before an
important meeting of the board of directors a;nd sat
down at that meeting according to her testimony and
voted the alienation of all remaining property in this
corporation without the slightest knowledge of what it
was all about, without any conception of what her duties
were and with no apparent desire to do anything except
"relieve father". From all that appears from this record it is perfectly plain that when the board of directors
met each and all of them were either acting thro.ugh
ignorance or through stupidity to do with the sole remaining assets of this corporation entirely in the interests of the family of Nephi J. Hansen in the dividing
up of his property. The testimony is that this corporation had been the main support of this family for many
years, that Nephi J. Hansen had run it, not like a czar,
but as if it was his private personal property, to do with
as he saw fit and with accountability to no one. It had
been a good thing, and in the hands of some person
younger in age with some get-up-and-go in his system
it could be made into ·a much better thing. It was too
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good. a thing for the Hansen family to let out ·of its control by the untimely death or indisposition of Nephi ,f.
Hansen.
Nephi J. Hansen and his son sat down and made a
deal about this property without any attempt to get any
offers from any other person, without any attempt to
ascertain what it would bring on the open market by
offering it for sale or making known to the public generally that it was for sale, and at a time when the fortunes of the corporation were on the up-grade and the
property itself was bringing in more and more revenue-3.

There can be no argument about the latter statement despite the fact that brother William disputes the
statement made ·by Lewis F. Hansen that the investigation made by Lewis F. Hansen produced the information that the property was for the first time full)~
rented, that rents were being paid promptly, that tenants
were anxious to renew their leases and were not adverse
to increases in rents. Out of the mouth of William Hansen comes the information that rents were on the increase, going from $13,000.00 in 1943 to $17,000.00 in
1944 and in excess of $7,000.00 for the first four month8
of 1945, or, if the trend toward increase did not continue
through 1945, of at least $22,000.00 in 1945. Clyde Hansen testified that there were no bills owing as far as he
knew, although as previously stated he kept no books
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or records ~d did not know much about them~ To say
this ~orporation was in such a ~ad shape that a s·ale
had to be consumn1ated in order to protect the interest
of the stockholders, particularly when the sale resulted
in the stockholders absolutely getting nothing, under
the facts and circumstances shown .in this case, is to
deny common sense. There is not one bit of evidence
that the mortgage holder was about to foreclose and,
even if it had foreclosed, the stockholders could suffer
no greater loss than they did by reason of the sale that
was attempted to be consummated. This corporation
had no other property and any deficiency which might
have been rendered certainly would not have affected
the stockholders, and under the evidence a foreclosure
sale probably would have been had for more than the
mortgage. On a foreclosure sale the company might
lose everything, even granting that its financial condition was in the worst of shape, and by this sale the corporation gained absolutely nothing.
Add to all the foregoing that the price paid did
not amount of $10,000.00 but only in round numbers
$8700.00. The court after having heard the evidence
found the fair and reaso1;1able value to be $100,000.00
at the time of the sale. As previously stated, an exceptionally well qualified witness testified it was reasonably
worth $115,000.00. .Add the fact that a so-called board
of directors on the face of written minutes authorized
a sale without putting in the name of the purchaser
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when the name was already known and when in fact
the deed had already been executed. Add Nephi .J.
Hansen's reluctance, nay, studied refusal to inform any
stockholder about the sale long after it had been consummated. Add the uncontradicted fact as shown by
this record that the entire ,amount received went intQ
the personal pocket of the president of this corporation,
a portion on a claim for back salary about which there
is not the slightest proof, and a portion by endorsement
of a check which was finally deposited to his personal
company. Add the fact that William L. H,ansen, despite
his protestations, saw a copy of the resolution by which
the board gave $5,000.00 to his father, and yet six months
later he turned over an additional $3800.00 to his father,
well knowing that his father had pocketed the previous
$5,000.00, and ,a mere cursory examination of the last
check a few days later would reveal that his father had
pocketed the final rpayment. Add the fact that after
William L. Hansen got hold of this property rents of
$90,000.00 were collected in the next thirty-five months
by William H,ansen. This is an average of in excess or
$2570.00 ,a month or nearly $31,000.00 a year. The result makes it impossible to say this property was disposed of by the officers of this corporation fairly, openly, in good faith, and for the best interests of the stockholders of this corporation and in a manner free from
fraud and over-reaching as against the stockholders.
We quote from the language of this court in Noble
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Mercantile Company v. Mt. Pleasant E. Co-op Inst., 42
Pacific 869, 12 Utah 213:
''They are chosen by the stockholders, and
are entrusted ·with the exclnsiYe control of the
property and the management of the corporate
business. This creates a fiduciary relation between them and the stockholders, and the corporate property becomes impressed with a trust,
which must be administered for the exclusive
benefit of the stockholders while the corporation
is solvent, and for the benefit of the creditors
when it becomes insolvent, and ceases to longer
pursue the objects of its creation."
We also quote from two other Utah cases, Victor
Mining Company v. National Bank, et al, 15 Utah 391, 49
Pacific 826:
"The law will not permit an officer of a corporation to act for the company and for himself
in making any contract between them, or in any
transaction to the subject matter of which they
may have, or may thereby acquire, conflicting
interests. In such case the agreement or assent
of the officer will not bind the company. Officers
of corporations are bound to exercise their official powers in the utmost good faith for the
benefit of their principals, in making or consenting to any transaction, and the law will not allow
them, as to the same transaction, to act for their
own benefit. The agent cannot act for himself
and his principal as to anything with respect to
which their interests may vary. The reason is
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that self-interest may prevent him from the performance of the duties he owes his principal.''

Mcintyre v. The Ajax Mining Co. et al, 17 Utah 213,
53 Pacific 1124 :
''This is a controversy over the affairs of a
corporation, in which the acts of the directors
are involved, and the rights of the stockholders
are to be determined. In such case the acts of
directors, because of the fiduciary relations
· existing between the officers and stockholders,
will be closely scrutinized in equity, and the directors held to a strict measure of care, duty,
fidelity, and disability. Honest and faithful administration of corporate affairs, and fidelity of
the trustee to the cestuis que trustent, are what
the law aims at; and directors of a corporation
will not be permitted to gain a pecuniary advantage over the stockholders because of their
official positions, and consequent superior knowledge of the affairs of the company. 'That a
director of a joint stock corporation occupies one
of those fiduciary relations where his dealings
with the subject matter of his trust or agency,
and with the beneficiary or party whose interest
is confided to his care, is viewed with jealousy by
the courts, and may be set aside on slight grounds,
is a doctrine founded on the soundest morality,
and which has received the clearest recognition
in this court and in others.' Oil Co. v. Marbury,
91 U. S. 587; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen 52; People
v. Township Board of Overyssel, 11 Mich. 222.''

In Ryan v. Old Veteran Mining Company, et al,
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(Idaho 1923), 218 Pacific 381, the Supre1ne Court of
Idaho had this to s~y :
''Directors of corporations act in a fiduciary
capacity. They hold the corporate property in
trust. and any attempt on their part to divest
the use of such property to their personal profit
or interest, is a violation of the trust imposed by
Yirtue of the office.''
Fairness and good faith are essential on the part
of those acting under statutory authority in the sale of
all of the corporate assets over the protest of minority
stockholders. Ervin v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 27 Federal 625:
"The right of the specified n1ajority to sell
all the assets is absolute in so far as the fact of
sale,- and whether one should be made, is concerned. Upon the question of terms and conditions, however, the expediency thereof and
whether they are for the best interests of the
corporation must be honestly and in good faith
considered. While it is the right of the majority
to pra~tically desert the corporate venture by
selling out its assets, and thereby, in the case of
a highly profitable concern, deprive their associates of the opportunity to reap gains in the future by continuing in business, yet .this right
cannot be exercised except upon terms and conditions that are fair to the corporation. The price
to be paid, the manner of payment, the terms of
credit, if any, and such like questions, must all
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meet the test of the corporation's best interest."

Allied Chemical ,dl; Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co.,
(Delaware) 120 Atlantic 486.
The question of price, where a minority stockholder
Is objecting to a sale of the corporate assets, is not
purely a business matter, but the court must, in order
to determine good faith, consider the fairness of the
price paid.

Re American Telegraph & Cable Co., 248 N. Y.
Supp. 98.
This court, in Beggs v. Myton Canal <f; Irrigation
Co., 179 Pacific 984, 54 Utah 120, had before it a contract
made by a corporation for the disposal of all its assets.
The court says :
''In the case at bar neither bad faith nor deceit were proved by the plaintiffs. The evidence
affirmatively shows good faith and honesty and
probably good judgment by the directors of the
company in making the Taylor contr~act, as also
by the majority of the stockholders in ratifying
the same. Apparently there was nothing for them
to do save to dispose of the company's canal and
ditch rights to the best possible advantage. The
company was devoid of funds ; its treasury stock
was uns~alable; unless it could convince state and
federal officials that it had the financial ability
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to proceed with its project, it eould obtain no
extPnsion of time in which to continue and complete its plans and work. It could not furnish the
required proof of financial strength; to save its
water filings and other rights it ·was necessary
to obtain financial assistance; the loss of the entire property was imminent; the proposed contraet with Taylor offered hope and promise of
saYing a substantial sum to the stockholders. Under these circumstances it was not only within
the po"~er of the directors and the majority stockholders, but it was their duty, to take some action·
which in their judgment would avoid the threatened loss and wreckage.''
Compare the present case with Beggs v. Myton
Canal & Irrigtaion Co .. Was the Granite Holding Com,
pany about to lose all that it had? Did the proposed
sale offer hope and promise of saving anything for the
stockholders? In the Beggs case by reason of the contract of sale the stockholders had an opportunity to get
water through canals to be made available by the purchaser. In the Beggs case by making the contract valuable water filings theretofore made could be proved up,
title obtained and the water made available to its stockholders. Was any like situation present here by reason
of the proposed sale to William Hansen~ Was the
corporation in such a state that should the sale not be
consummated the stockholders would be in a worse
position than they would have been were the contract
fully consummated? By the making of the contract and
the transfer of the title the stockholders here lost
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ey~rything

of any value tl;tey had. As already pointed
out, foreclosure did not mean anything to these stockholders. For whose benefit was .this contract made~ As
pointed out in the Beggs case, was it made for the best
possible advantag.e of the ~ompany or was it made for
the best :possible advantage of Nephi J. Hansen, his
family, and particularly his son William L. Hansen.
Appellant in its brief ·makes short reference to
Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co. From appellant'~
reference to this case one would think that the Beggs case
involved rights of creditors. As a matter of f·act, in th~
Beggs case the plaintiff was a minority stockholder and
the rights of creditors were not involved at all. Aside
from this proposition it is inconceivable to us that
creditors would have any greater right in the corporate
property than stockholders. If the. corporation cannot
dispose of its property so as to result in a fraud on
creditors, it seems to us that it cannot dispose of its
property so it will result in a fraud upon the stockholders. We recognize of course in the case of an insolvent corporation creditors must first be paid before
stockholders participate in any of the remaining assets,
but that is a question of priority and not a question of
selling corporate property in a fraudulent fashion so
as to cheat either creditors or stockholders.
'rhere are many cases that any trans·action by a
corporate officer with the corporation by which he se-
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cures corporate property are presumptively fraudulent
and eventhough the price, ter1ns of sale ·and everythl'ng
else is fair, they are subjeet to rancellation at the request of the corporation.
There are many cases that transfers of corporate
property to a wife of a corporate officer are in the same
category, and in view of the family set-up here and this
entire transaction there existed here as close a cohesion
between these sons and daughters and this father as
ordinarily exists between husband and wife, and under
the circumstances we can see no good reason why in
this case this court should not view the question here
presented in the same fashion. But even the adoption
of such a rule is not necessary for this court to ·affirm
this judgment. Ample evidence is here present to sustain a finding that there was a fraud perpetrated by
father, son and family upon this corporation and consequently upon the stockholders .

.·,..

.Appellant has much to say about the matter of price.
Let there be no misunderstanding, we freely confess
that some inadequacy of price is alone not enough to
avoid a. sale. To paraphrase some of the cases, inadequacy of price is not fraud, but certainly it is evidence
of fraud. We do not rely upon the inadequacy of this
price alone and we venture to say that had that been
the only proof this appeal would not be taken. But
coupled with all the other facts and circumstances in
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this case, what is the answer~ Was the contract openly
and fairly arrived at~ Did the officers of this corporation act for the best interest of the corporation and the
stockholders~ Did they perform the duties laid upon
them by the law~ Did William L. Hansen in dealing
with the officers and agents of this corporation act
frankly, openly and in good faith, or did he assist, advise and connive with his father and his brothers and
sisters to fraudulently obtain corporate property in
violation of all the ordinary concepts of decency and
fair dealing~
With respect to William L. Hansen's participation,
we present the following cases :

Old Mortgage & Finance Company v. Pasadena
Land Company, 216 N.W. 925, Michigan 1928:
'' 'If 'a third person joined with a corporate
officer in dealing with the corporation, with
knowledge that he is such officer, the contract
may be set aside as to him as well as the corporate officer. This is upon the theory that, where
a stranger participates with the officer of a corporation in the commission of an act of manifest
bad faith or breach of duty to it, he, equally, with
the officer, commits a wrong, and ought not to
derive profit from it.' ''
We quote from Cahall v. Lofland, (Delaware 1921),
114 Atlantic 224 at 237:
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•
'• One who partieipate~ with a tru~tee i11 the
breach of trust Inav be held liable in a court of
equity. If he still liolds the tru~t propert)' or its
proceeds. he may be held as constructiYP trustee
thereof: if he no longer holds the trust property,
or its proceeds, he may be held liable in equity
to account for the advantage deriYP<-L ''

Fletcher, Corporations, Revised 1943, Vol. 13, page
189 states:
"Even if circumstances are such as to warrant a transfer of all assets or all corporate property by a majority of stockholders or by the board
of directors, the transfer may be in fact fraudulent, oppressive or unfair to minority stockholders so as to warrant relief in their favor as representatives of the corporation, on the ground of
a breach of trust, regardless of whether the property is transferred to the majority stockholders
or managing officers themselves, * * * or to a
third p1erson. And the breach of trust may consist
in gains or advantages secured by the majority
at the expense of the minority, or the exclusion
of the minority from a fair participation in the
fruits of the sale, or the grossly inadequate price
paid for the property. (Italics ours.)
''In selling all of the assets, majority stockholders must exercise the highest degree of good
faith toward minority stockholders. N ave-McCord Mercantile Co. vs. Ranney, 29 Fed. 2nd 383;
Hayden v. Official Hotel Red Book and Directory
Co., 42 Fed. 875; Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash.
454. 218 Pac. 269."
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The appellant argues that these plaintiffs have no
right of action· against William L. Hansen to set aside
the deed. Let it be remembered this is a secondary or
deriyative action for the benefit of themselves and others
siniilarly situated.
The appellant ~also argues that the majority of the
stockholders could meet and satisfy this transaction and
thus prevent the recapture of the property in an action
of this sort.:.., In his amended answer the appellant
pleads· such a meeting, but no proof was offered to
support it and it was abandoned, probably because
appellant. himself had no faith in the claim. It seems·
foolish to ma]{e any reply to such an argument. The
above citations answer it. But to put it more plainly,
how can the many· defraud the few. any more effectively
than a few defraud the many~ Can four partners defraud their three associates when three cannot defraud
the four~ If the answer 'is in the affirmative, then a
large corporation could defraud an individual when in
a like case the individual would have to make restitution
to the corporation. It seems to us the ·answers are so
patent to require no further comment.
5~

The Accounting.
· (a) William L. Hansen is a Constructive Trustee.

''Where the owner of property transfers it,
being induced by fraud, duress or undue influence of the transferee, the transferee holds the
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property upon a constructive trust for the trans,..
feror."
·

Restatement of the Law, Restitution, Section 166.
''A constructive trust, or, as it frequently is
called, a trust ex nmleficio, ex delicto, a trust de
son tort, or an involuntary or implied trust is a
trust by operation of law which arises contrary
to intention and in invitum, against one who, by
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse
of confidence, by commission of wrong, Qr by any
form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way
against equity and good conscience, either has
obtained or holds the legal right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience,
hold and enjoy. It is raised by equity to satisfy
the demands of justice. ''

54 .American Jurisprudence, page 167, Trusts, section 218.

''Where one procures the legal title to property from another by fraud or misrepresentation
or concealment, or where one makes use of some
influential or confidential relation which he holds
toward the owner of the legal title to obtain such
legal title from him upon more advantageous
terms than he could otherwise have obtained,
equity will convert such a one thus obtaining
property into a trustee of a 'constructive trust.' ''

Lawley et al v. Hicloenlooper et -al, (Utah 1923) 61
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Utah 298, 212 Pacific 526. See also Chadwick v. Arnold
et al, (Utah 1908) 34 Utah 48, 95 Pacific 527.
''A constructive trust, or as frequently called
an involuntary trust, is a fiction of equity, devised
to the end that the equitable remedies available
against a conventional fiduciary may be available
under the same name and processes against one
who through fraud or mistake or by any means
ex maleficio acquires the property of another.''

Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm et al, (Utah
1930), 290 Pacific 161, 76 Utah 372, at page 389 of Utah
r~port.

(b) William L. Hansen, Being a Constructive Trustee, is
Under the Duty of Making Restitution and An Accounting.

''A person who has tortiously acquired or retained a title to land, chattels or choses in action
is under a duty of restitution to the person entitled thereto.''

Restatement of the Law, Restitution, section 130.
"(1) A person under a duty to another to
make restitution of property received by him or
of its value is under a duty
'' (a) to account for· the direct product of
the subject matter received while in his possession, and
'' (b) to pay such additional amount as com-
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pensation for the U8P of the subject Inatter as
will be just to both partie~ in YiPw of the fault,
if any, of either or both of them.
"(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) is applicable to an action brought solely to recover
the income or Yalne of the use of the subject
matter, or interest upon the amount of its value."

Restatement of the Law, Restitution, section 157.
"It is a strict duty of a trustee to keep and
render a full and accurate record and accounting
of his trusteeship to the cestui que trust, and the
duty is strictly enforced by the courts. It is commonly governed by statutory provisions. Such
duty of the trustee is not affected by the fact that
he voluntarily assumed the trust. A trustee by
operation of law-constructive or resulting-must
account for and is chargeable with, subject to
proper credits, property subjecurto the trust.''
54 American Jurisprudence, page 396, Trusts, Section 497.

''It is a general principle that one who. acquires land by fraud, misrepresentation, imposition, or under any other such circumstances as to
render it inequitable for him to retain the property, is in equity to be regarded as a trustee ex
maleficio thereof for a person who suffers by
reason of the fraud or other wrong (citing cases).
It is elementary that one who holds property in
trust for another may be required to render an
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accounting of the rents and profits. of property
so held.'''

Deaorso v. Thontas, et al., (Utah 1935), -89 Utah
160, 50 Pacific (2) 951.
(c) William L. Hansen, Being a Constructive Trustee and
Having a Duty to· Account, is Chargeable With the Income
From This Property, i.e., the Rents Received.

We have already called the Court's attention to
section 157 of Resta·t·ement of Law, Restitution (see
ante, page 37). We wish to call the Court's attention to
comment d Land under that section and illustrations 3
and 4. We quote:

"d. Land. If the recipient obtained land by
fraud, duress, or other consciously tortious means,
the claimant is entitled, at his election, to receive
its incom~ or the reasonable value of its use .

..

..,,

''Illustrations :
'' 3. A transfers Blackacre to B, being induced to do this by B 's fraudulent representation
that A owes B $10,000. B takes 'possession of
Blackacre and rents it for $1000 for a year. At
the end of the year, discovering the fraud, A
brings a bill in equity to rescind the transaction
and to obtain the land. A is entitled to retain
the title to Blackacre and at his election to receive from B $1000 with interest from the time
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of its receipt to the time of the decree or the
reasonable rental value of the land (less expenditures by B in accordance with the rule stated
in Sec. 158).
'' 4. Same facts as in Illustration 3, except
that at the end of the year B sells the land for
$12,000. A is entitled to receive from B $12,000
or the reasonable value of the land, plus $1000
or plus the reasonable rental value of the land
for a year, plus interest on such amount to the
time of the decree (less taxes and other expenses
as stated in Sec. 158)."
A Utah case is in point. This Court in the second
appeal of Lawley v. Hickenlooper, already referred to,
s·aid:

"• * '*' There was testimony as to the reasonable rental value of the several premises; also,
there was testimony that much of the time the
premises had not been rented, and that the sum
of $250 was approximately the amount which had
been received. Both counsel for plaintiffs and
counsel for Sheya agree that Sheya held this
property as a constructive trustee. 'The liability
of implied, resulting, constructive or other trusts
which do not impose any duty of renting the
property on the trustees is confined to the rents
which they actually receive or the benefit which
they have enjoyed from using the property themselves.' 39 Cyc. 324. ''
Lawley et ux v. Hickenlooper et al.., (Utah, 1924 ),
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231 Pacific 821, 64 Utah 534, at 547.

The test is not the reasonable rental value of the
property where the taking is tortious. One taking in
bad faith is in a much different position than one acting
honestly. One acting in bad faith is entitled to and
receives much less consideration than one acting in
good faith. Both law and equity are repleat with illustrations of this situation. Compare Illustrations 3 and
4 of Restatement, Restitution, cited above with Illustration 5. Compare Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194
Pacific 117, where the taking and occupancy were in
good faith, with Van W·agoner, v. Whitmore, et al, 58
Utah 418, 199 P~acifi.c 670. In this latter case, an action
in ejectment, defendant is ousted when his title fails;
the plaintiff recovered the rental value as increased
because of the defendant's improvements where the
defendant failed to show color of title or good faith
possession, and the defendant failed to recover anything
by way of improvements.
The evidence is that rents paid were $90,017.00 UiJ·
to June 30, 1948 (R. 499). By exhibit 8 the defendant
showed additional rental income to October 1, 1948, of
$7,699.00. (Received in evidence at R. 606). These
figures produce a total $97,686.00. There is no other
evidence. No one was produced who testified as to
reasonable rent~al value of these premises up to the
latter date. Even if reasonable rental value was con-
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trolling, in the absence of evidence except as to the
amount of rents received, it seems to us the only conclusion to be drawn is that the reasonable rental Yalue
was the amount of rent received, i.e., $97,686.00.
True, there was evidence rents were increased. This
is business property and not subject to O.P.A. All rents
were going up during this period. That is a matter of
common knowledge. The very purpose of the Price
Control Act was to prevent increases in rentals on housing property, but no controls were put upon commercial
property.
Appellant argues an increase in rents was brought
about by reason of improvements placed on the property by him, that rents were fixed by ~eason of the evidence as to what they were during the first four months
of 1945, •and then assumes the increase was brought
about by improvements put there by him. There is no
evidence of any kind as to the Vlalue of the improvements, how much they enhanced the value of the property or how much they increased the rents, except the
stipulation at R. 515. The only evidence is as to how
much the claimed improvements cost.
Appellant also contends he is only accountable for
the reasonable rental value of the premises and not for
the •amount of rents received. But as previously stated
the only evidence on the subject is the total of the rents
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rec.eived. Van Wagoner v. Whitmot"te is to the effect that
one occupying in bad faith must pay reasonabl.e .rental
value with the improvements on, and the present case
reasonable rental value and rents re.cejved 1are synono.,
mous.
There is some authority for the proposition that a
bad faith occupier is entitled to credit for the increase
in the rent produced by the improvements. See section
28 of 31 Corpus Juris, Improvements, page 320. But he
is not entitled to credit for increased rents and improvements. We show hereafter this appellant is not entitled to credit for improvements, and the case was tried
on the theory that perhaps he should be allowed the
increase in the rents, and that is the reason for the
stipulation sho·wn at R. 515.
Actually, Utah law is not in accordance with the
statement in Corpus Juris above referred to, and is much
harsher on 1a defendant in the position of William L.
Hansen. Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, supra.
However, appellant has no just complaint on this
item, because the trial 'court actually allowed a credit
of $4,240.87, the amount of the agreed increased rents~
as will hereafter be shown.
(d) Credits to be Allowed William L. Hansen.

We concede that William L. Hansen is entitled to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
credit for the following items, but ·those items alonP,
i.e.: Payments of principal ·and interest on the mortgage; taxes paid, reasonable and necessary cost of
operation; reasonable cost of necessary repairs. We
refer to Section 158 of Restatement of the Law, Restit'l:.tion, which reads:

''A person is entitled to specific restitution
of property from another or to the product of
such property only on condition that he compensate the other for e~enditures with reference to
the subject matter which have inured to his benefit, to the extent that justice between the parties
requires.''
We also Ciall the Court's attention to the comments
commencing at page 630. The comment is to the effect
that one who takes property wrongfully is not entitled
to recover the cost of the repairs but only the amount
by which the repairs increased the value of the property;
but at the trial we conceded that the cost of repairs was
a proper credit and we still concede it except as to repairs shown on Exhibit 8. At the trial we ~also conceded
\rarious specific items, and we do not wish to be understood ·as attempting to withdraw those concessions, although the classification of the expenditure made by
Hansen In many of those instances was not clearly
shown.
Operation Costs.

As before stated, we concede these should be al-
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lowed, and they were allowed. Light, heat and water,
hauling garbage, one-half total telephone expense (more
than the monthly charge), damages paid to tenants all
on exhibit 7, and the monthly telephone charge, heat,
lights, water, and trash disposal expense on exhibit 8
were allowed. But by making that concession we do not
wish to be understood as consenting to any allowance
by way of salary and taxes thereon paid to Nephi J.
H·ansen or any allowance to WilHam L. Hansen on his
claim for services. Such items were disallowed.
Now, in the first place these two men collaborated
together to defraud this corporation of the property.
In addition the evidence is that Nephi Hansen did
nothing at the office; he certainly kept no books and
rendered no service o~ any value; nor was there ·any
proof that his services were at all necessary for the
preservation of this property. It would be strange indeed if two thieves were allowed salaries for looking
after stolen property, and these two men are exactly
in that position. The· trial court, as we understand it,
based his disallowance of these two items on that propo.:.
sition.
At one time trustees with active duties under an
express trust were not entitled to compensation unless
the trustor so declared in his deed or instrument of
trust. This has been changed, and he is now generally
allowed reasonable compensation based upon the value
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of his services to the trust, or to the beneficiary. We
have made a diligent search and have been unable 1o
find any case which hold8 that a constructive trustee is
entitled to compensation, and we venture the opiniou
that the reason for the lack of such cases is that no ~ueh.
trustee ever yet has had the temerity to ask for it. ''Thus
if the recipient was tortious, he should b~ar any losses
resulting from the transaction and should not benefit
from profits.'' Pages 630 and 631, Restatement, Restitution. If a trustee gambles with trust funds, the losses
are on him, and if a profit is realized the tr-ust estate
gets the profit, and no court would allow him anything
for his misuse of trust property. To do otherwise would
put a premium on improper and illegal actions of a
trustee. Now, this trustee and his father combined and
conspired together to defraud this corporation of its
property, and to say that they should have compensation for looking after it during the time they kept it
away from the corporation would put a premium on dishonesty; for the net result would be that two in their
position could very well say, ''if we do not succeed in
our dishonesty, at least we will not lose as a court will
compensate us for our services and we will be out
nothing." Neither the law nor equity aids a wrongdoer,
and these two men were wrongdoers.
There is plenty of law that a trustee who is right
to start with and then go~s wrong can be and should be
denied compensation. We quote from 54 American
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Jurisprudence 423, section_ 538 of Trusts, as follows:
~·. ! .. :

.

\t. f:'':

.

"The general rule is that a trustee who repudiates the trust or violates or neglects his d~ty
is not entitled to compensation or commissions.
Certainly, the court, in its discretion, may in such
case deny or reduce compensation, although no
such power is given to it by statute.
. "Wilfulness and bad faith in misconduct are
grounds for completely depriving a trustee of
compensation, and recklessness or gross negligence, without intentional violation of duties, effecting serious loss to the estate, justifies a
court's denial of compensation to a trustee; to
allow compensation under such circumstances.
would be to put a premium on recklessness and
negligence.''
We quote from a headnote of a Colorado case, Pollard v. Lathrope, 20 Pacific 251, 12 Colorado 171:
''Where one in the possession of property,
and sought to be charged as trustee, denies the
trust, claiming title as absolute owner, he cannot, on judgment being rendered against him,
claim any compensation for services in the management of the property.''
And from an Oklahoma case, Roywr v. Dobbins, 239
Pacific 157, 111 Oklahoma 156:
''Trustee, who has denied trust and claims
trust property as his own, is not entitled to be
reimbursed for expenses incurred in manage-
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ment of trust estate after such repudiation."
And from an Oregon case, Royal v. Royal, 47 Pacific
828, 30 Oregon 448 :
''A trustee who occupies · the land, and receives the income therefrom, for which he renders
no account, is not entitled to compensation for
services.''
How can \Villiam L. Hansen claim and be allowed
a credit for moneys paid to his father-a man who violated his trust to the corporate defendarrt-'-for doing
nothing much particularly except now and then sitting
around an office, answering the telephone and listening
to an occasional complaint of a tenant. It appears more
likely that William was paying his father a quid pro quo
for his making it so easy for William to get possession
of this property. There is no proof whatsoever that the
father did anything to benefit this corporation after
William took possession of the property, and trust funds
cannot be charged with payments without proof either
of specific authorization or benefit.
In his sound discretion the trial court denied
credits for these two items; there is no proof of abuse
of that discretion; there is ample evidence to support
his decision. This court should not upset his ruling in
view of the record here.
Improvements.
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tend that William L. Hansen under the circumstances
of this case was not entitled to take any credit for anything by way of improvements. As to credit for improvements we refer to Comment d, Improvements and
additions of Restatement, page 632 Restitution."
At law one who improved another's land could not
recover anything for improvements. See Jensen et ux
v. Probert et al, (Oregon, 1944), 148 Pacific (2) 248. The
discussion starts at page 251. This applies to good
':faith holders as well as others, but as the case points
out equity "borrowing from the civil law, would under
some circumstances soften the harsh rule of the common
law by allowing compensation by an occupier who in
good faith improves land. * * * ''
Occupying claimants statutes were passed by many
states to alleviate the harshness of the common law
rule. Utah has such a statute. See sections 78-6-1 and
104-57-4, Utah Code. But under this statute this court
has held that one not possessing the property in good
faith cannot recover the value of the improvements.
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Company, 47 Utah 238,
152 Pacific 1180.
In equity a bad faith claimant C'annot recover for
improvements.
''In all cases where an occupant is entitled
to recover for improvements made to the prop-
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erty, the elen1ent of good faith and innocent mi8take is essential; ·for, if a person lays out money
on another's property, with knowledge or notice
of the true state of the title, he has no claim to
be reimbursed for improvements.''
3 Pomeroy's Eq,uity Jurispnulence, Section 1241.
''''/here the deed is void because of a wrong
or fraud of the grantee, it does not constitute
such color of title as to entitle him to compensation for his improvements.''

31 Corpus Juris 332, citing an Iowa case, Lindt v.
Uihlein, 89 N.W. 214, an action to rescind and recover
property.
In Gaetke v. Ebarr, (~Iinnesota, 1935), 263 N.W.
448, where misrepresentations which induc,ed the plaintiff to exchange property were fraudulent and false ~and
where the plaintiff brought suit to rescind the contract,
it was held that no recovery for improvements would be
permitted the defendant since he held the property
transferred to him in bad faith.

In Peterson v. Weber County et al, (Utah, 1939),
103 Pacific (2) 652, 99 Utah 281, an equitable action
where there was ~an answer asking for affirmative relief
for the value of improvements put upon the property,
this court held the possession was in good faith and
allowed recovery of the value of the improvements. In
a separate opinion Wolfe, J., states the action partakes
of a bill quia timet, discusses whether or not a separate
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adion should have been maintained by, the defendant
for the value. of the improvements, and says that it is
jnhe~·ent in equity to enter a decree on condition of an
allo;wance for the value of the improvements, and we
think implies that whether the relief prayed by the occupant is under the occupying claimants statute or in
equity the basis of his recovery will be the same; i.e.,
whether or not he was ·and is a good faith occupier.
It strikes us that this case at least acknowledges
that whether in law under this statute or in equity, the
rule is, before improvements can be allowed, the claim~
ant must be shown to have been a good faith holder of
the title and to have made the improvements in good
faith. A· bad faith claimant cannot recover for improvements under this statute. Should he be any more
favored in equity 1

The trial court allowed defendant for each and
every item of claimed improvements on the first page
of Exhibit 7: elevator $2100.00, stairway $700.00, basement $1440.00, a total of $4240.87, and $466.00 for architects' fees; and on the second page of Exhibit 7 all of
the items, totaling $2252.45, of which all but $140.00 for
office supplies, are listed by way of improvements. We
think these a1lowances were contrary to the law of this
state on the basis of the authorities above cited, and
that was our· position at the trial. Included in the
amounts allowed was $4240.87, referred to previously
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at page 42 of this brief, and it does not make any difference whether the allowance was made by way of increased rents or by way of improven1ents. Certainly
appellant is not entitled to haYe a double allo,vance
made for that sum.
Other Disallowances.

Other items disallowed on Exhibit 7 were a contribution of $500.00 to the Sugarhouse Chamber of
Commerce Centennial Program; $600.00 claimed to have
been spent at the .Ambassador Athletic Club in wining
and dining various persons ; $208.01 telephone tolls;
$443.96 claimed interest on loan made by defendant William L. Hansen; attorney's fees of $1117.50, and $35.70
for flowers. There is no proof of any kind that this corporation benefited by any of these expenditures or that
they were at all necessary to protect this property. The
fact of the matter is they are strictly personal expenditures made by the appellant. We do not think much
further comment is necessary with respect to the disallowances of these i terns.
William L. Hansen was taking out of this property
a great deal more money than he was putting into it,
and even if he did borrow some money from the Davis
County Bank, if he had not been so free in his expenditures, as the accounting shows during the period covered by Exhibit 7 he is $24,788.96 short in his accounts,
he would have had ample moneys to use for proper purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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poses and no necessity would have existed to borrow
money. As to attorney's fees, it is perfectly apparent
frmn the evidence that those fees were in part for work
done on this case by appellant's attorney and as to any
other items, there was no benefit to the corporation. As
to the i tern of telephone bills disallowed, by agreement
$287.61 as shown on the first page of Exhibit 7 was allowed. The evidence was that the monthly rate on the
telephone was $11.93 per month so the allowance was
of an average in excess of $12.00 per month, more than
necessary to take care of the monthly telephone bill.
The balance of the bill of $208.01 was for long distance
calls and other items not shown to be chargeable to the
property.
The court also disallowed an item of $5609.15
shown on the second page of Exhibit 7 as checks drawn
to cash not otherwise included. With respect to this
item and with respect to the accounting generally, it
must be borne in mind that the duty to account was on
the 'appellant. If he did not keep rproper books and r~
ords so that the items could be classified it is too bad.
It was his duty to keep clear and accurate accounts.
From the way in which these accounts were kept one
is led to -the conclusion that they were purposely
jumbled up so that the situation never could be properly unwound. The type of records kept was one of the
reasons that at the trial we agreed ·to pass many of the
items contained on the first page of Exhibit 7 without
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proof, particularly the Inajor portion of the iten1s listed
under repairs and improvements, as otherwise the
hearing on the accounting would have been interminable. It is doubtful that \Yilliam L. Hansen ever could
justify any fair proportion of the $22,859.41 allm,·ed
him therein. \Ye quote from 54 American Jurisprudence
at page 398, section 499 of Trusts:
"The refusal or failure of a trustee to account
furnishes a good reason for adopting ,against him
the most rigid rules of calculation, and if a trustee
does not keep clear, distinct, and accurate accounts, all intendments and presumptions are
against him. The rule is applicable to refusal to
account for rents and profits. Inadequacy of his
accounts may result in his being made to pay costs
of an accounting and the expenses of an accountant. Certainly, uncertainty in the accounts of a
trustee, which is due to his own gross negligence,
does not necessitate acceptance as verities, and
the allowance, of his unverified and unexplained
claims for fees and expenses.· Dereliction of the
trustee in his accounting is a factor in charging
him with interest or income.''
On Exhibit 8 the trial court disallowed $715.43
labeled repairs as there was no proof that the same were
necess·ary, and also because they were made subsequent
to a finding by the court that this property belonged to
the corporation, and ~after the court ordered a decree
that the deed should be set aside. There is no justification whatsoever in the evidence for the allowing of
any such sum under the circumstances.
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The same is true with respect to the item of $617.08
office e~pe~s~. It is absolutely inc9nceivable that there
wou~d be that sum of money spent during a three month
period in operating an office where the only item of
business was the collection of rents.
Disallowance of a portion of the telephone bill was
made and only that portion was allowed covering the
monthly charge of $11.98 a month for the three months
covered by that exhibit.
The item of $600.00 for office salaries, the same
having been paid to Nephi J. Hansen, was disallowed
as were all the balance of the items shown on that exhibit. These latter did not represent any expenditures
of any kind, but ·were merely accruals in the accounts
to take care of some prospective future expenditure
and were items set up by the accountant. It will be
time enough for a court to consider those expenditures
when and if they are made.
For the information of this court, we will state that
the pencilled 'and pen and ink figures on Exhibit 7 were
made by the trial court. On· the first page of Exhibit· 7
the items disallowed were marked ''out'' and the ones
allowed were marked '' o.k. '' On page two of the exhibit
the items marked with an X were disallowed and the
items marked with a check or a dash were allowed. The
items allowed and dis allowed on Exhibit 8 are clearly
stated to be either "allow" or "out".
1
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Appellant contends that he 1s entitled to have allowed to him a sum 'Of money, i.e., $8780.24 \vhirh lH~
paid in two installments, $5,000.00 at about the time the
deed was delivered, and the balance of $3,780.:24 some
six months later. There is no proof that the corporation
ever got this money. In fact the proof is otherwise.
The trial court specifically found that the money went
to Nephi J. Hansen personally. The facts about the
situation have already been referred to in this brief.
We see no reason to re-argue our position but so there
is no uncertainty about it we wish to state in view of
the entire record it is perfectly apparent this money
was known to go to the appellant's father to take care
of him and there was no attempt by anybody, corporate
officers or William L. Hansen, to do anything about it
except to let the father appropriate it. In many ways
that payment is in the same category 'as payments made
by William L. Hansen to his father after he had obtained the deed. We cannot see under the facts in the
case how the trial court could give William L. Hansen
credit for this sum,. The board of directors apparently
authorized Nephi J. H'ansen to take the first $5,000.00,
but in view .of the set-up on the board, that was the
same as if Nephi J. Hansen authorized himself to take
it. Nobody ever produced any evidence the money was
owing, except the mere statement in the resolution; the
secretary of the corporation on the stand knew nothing
about any such debt; and in view of what happened to
the subsequent P'ayment it seems clear William L. HanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sen and his father, and the family, used that method of
getting some money to the father, knowing the same
would go there and knowing the ·corporation would receive absolutely nothing.
Appellant makes no attempt to analyze the accounting features of this case. He generally levels a
shot-gun blrast at all of it. Remarks of the Oklahoma
court in Boyer v. Dobbins, already referred to, are pertinent here. We quote from page 156 of 239 Pacific:
''We are simply invited to examine this long
and complicated account and see whether we can
discover some item or items which the court improperly disallowed. This we decline to do. If
the defendant desired a review of the action of
the trial court on. this branch of the case, he
should have pointed out in his brief the errors
complained of. Besides all of the expenses claimed by the defendant were incurred after he had
repudiated the trust relation, and it would not
· have been error for the court to have disallowed
the entire claim. Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567,.
6 S. Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940; Somerset Ry. v. Pierce,
98 Me. 528, 57 A. 888; Hanna v. Clark, 204 Pa.
145, 53 A. 757; Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo. 171;
20 p. 251." * * *

6. Conclusion.
Appellant makes many assertions in his brief, some
of which we do not think require any comment. He states
that Nephi J. Hansen was the only stockholder. There
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is not one bit of proof as to how much stock Nephi J.
Hansen or his family had or that he or they had any at
the time of trial except ~Irs. Southwick.
e were g·oing
to put Xephi J. Hansen on the stand (R. 258) but counsel,
particularly itir. Rawlings, at a conference a.t the bench
with the trial court, stated ~ ephi J. Hansen was in
such a condition by reason of age and infir1nities he
could remember nothing and knew nothing, and so we
abandoned him as a witness. (See also R. 519). Much
stock is outstanding in this corporation in the hands of
persons other than the Hansens and three stockholders
appeared, produced tpeir stock and were sworn and
testified at the trial. Their rights and those of others
similarlr situated is the issue in this case, not the rights
of Nephi J. Hansen, even though he is a stockholder.

'V

The trial court from the bench made a staten1ent
that the corporation was Nephi J. Hansen's alter ego,
or something to that effect, and a finding of the same
character was made. The sense of the statement and
the finding is that Nephi J. Hansen so regarded it and
had always treated it as being himself, and there is no
need to make any statement to support such a proposi~
tion except to S'ay that his actions and the actions of his
family as shown by this record is proof positive thereof.
Appellant at one point in his brief makes the statoment that when the ~urported sale was being handled
the corporation was being represented by competent
counsel, intimating it was Edward W. Clyde. The fact

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58
of

th~

matt.er is that Edward W. Clyde had nothing to
~ with t~is t:ransaGtion and only appeared on the scene
when the suit was filed, filing a d~murrer for the Gran..
ite Holding Company.
Appellant in effect claims the trial judge prejudged
the case, and appellant's counsel makes a personal issue
out of it by referring to another case involving a trust
relationship tried by the same judge which is now on
appeal to this court. The fact is that as shown by the
record the defendants and each of th~m had a full, fair,
and complete opportunity to be heard, and on the accounting the trial court was overly generous with the
appellant, jf in nothing else, at least with respect to
the improvement items, and a fair reading of the record
will disclose that many of the items allowed were supported by flimsiest pretexts of proof.
Three or four time in his brief appellant refers to
the alleged refusal of one of plaintiffs' attorneys to
answer as to "who hired him" and attempts to make
son1ething out of that, presumably on the theory that
it was counsel who drummed up the case. The fact is
that when that particular bit of by-pl·ay took place both
Mr. Jones and Mr. Jensen were making some attempted
jocular remarks, and although the cold record does not
reveal it, the refusal by Mr. Jensen was made in an
at~empted humorous fashion· without ~any desire to "conceal anything. It is perfectly plain that the trial court
so sensed the matter because if he had wanted to know
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who hired COUnsel it would haYe been an easy mattPl'
for him to insist upon an ans\ver and the same wou1ll
haYe been freely given.
Appellant has much to say about the way plaintiffs
came in and out of the case. This action was started lJ~·
Lewis F. Hansen and his brother and by counsel other
than the present counsel. Lewis F. Hansen quit on the
e'ye of trial. It was a fortunate thing that other stockholders found out about the action having been brought
and came in and had themselves made parties. It must
be borne in mind that this corporation, in accordance
with the testimony of the responsible officers, had absolutely no books and records of any kind, and even if
some stockholders had gone and made an inquiry to
detPrmine who the stockholders were, it would have
been without any result. It was well three stockholders
were found by the people ultimately interested in this
case who had stock certificates made out in their name:;
and title to which certificates cannot be questioned.
What difference does it make that the action was originally instituted by Lewis F. Hansen and apparently by
his brother Clyde, and that they got out of the ca~{~
before it was tried; when ultimately the case went to
judgment with three bona fide stockholders as parties
plaintiff. This is particularly true in view of the fact
that the action is a class action for the benefit of the
stockholder plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 1
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terest, probably different from that in the ordinary case
presented for decision, to see that justice is done and
that the rights of stockholders are not frittered away.
As indicative of that interest we call attention to the
rules of civil procedure adopted and in force in the
United States Courts. A portion of Rule 23 provides
that an action of this kind shall not be dismissed without approval of the court. It is perfectly apparent that
'fhe reason for the rule is to ;prevent stockholders bringing such an action where they represent themselves and
others similarly situated from being bought off and
settled with without the rights of all who are effected
being protected.
It would be strange indeed if the transaction here
brought to light should be approved by any court. Modern legislation, and we have in mind among others the
Securities Exchange Act, the Truth in Securities Act
and the Holding Company Act, show an awakening demand by the public that corporate officers and others,
in their dealings with respect to corp·orate property and
stockholders present and prospective, must be fair,
frank open and above-board, and they must make full and
complete disclosures with reS'pect to all of their transactions. At one time, perhaps, the inner workings of a
corporation and the fact that only a few might be hurt
thereby were apparently not the concern of anyone particularly, but that is no longer the rule of this day. A
corporate office today partakes of the nature of a public
trust, and corporate officers and agents cannot deal
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with corporate property as was done here: parcel it
out to a member of the fmuily to the detriment of
stockholders.

The trial court in this case, like every trial court,
had an opportunity to and did observe these witnessed.
The evidence had to be secured from the mouths of
the persons who were ''in on the deal''. Those persons'
attitude on the witness stand, their interest in the outcome of the case, their frankness and candor, or more
aptly, the lack of them, all took place under his eye and
in his hearing. There is no occasion to refer to any case
or any authority on this proposition. In any case these
are matters to be weighed in favor of supporting a
judgment.
The evidence, and the inferences to be drawn frorn
it, are all in favor of the judgment being a proper one.
That it should be affirmed is
Respectfully submitted,

EDGAR C. JENSEN
JOHN H. SNOW
ROBERT JOHN JENSEN
Attorneys for Respondents
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